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1 Introduction
The process of large-scale technical change involves not only the emergence of new tech-
nologies and refinement of existing ones, but also the structural change of the economy
whereas some older technologies and sectors are replaced by newer ones. This is the case
with renewable energy transition being actively pursued by many European economies
and the modernization of developing economies where traditional sectors are gradually
replaced by the more sophisticated ones.
Once such a structural change is of an issue it is important not only to understand
the drivers of this change, but also the impact of the changing structure of knowledge
spillovers being experienced by the R&D sector. Existing growth models fall short of
capturing both these issues. First, majority of the growth literature assumes a rather
simplistic structure of knowledge spillover. In particular, the intensity of spillovers is
assumed to be uniform across technologies, even if dependent on the existing number of
technologies, as in Peretto and Connolly (2007), Acemoglu et al. (2012) among others.
The recent exceptions are Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Chu et al. (2017) where firms’
heterogeneity is allowed for but this is not attributed to the structure of R&D spillovers
as a whole.
Second, the exit of outdated technologies is rarely accounted for and the range of
technologies is either stabilizing in the long-run, resulting in the vertical innovations
being the primary growth driver as in Peretto and Connolly (2007), or the range of
sectors grow in an unlimited way, as in Chu et al. (2012). In recent Hamano and Zanetti
(2017) endogenous process of firms’ entry and exit is modeled, but continuous structural
change is not the growth driver there. At last, in Akcigit and Kerr (2018) heterogeneous
doubly-differentiated R&D is modelled, but lacking dynamic structural change.
At the same time there is increasing evidence that growth rates of the modern economy
may be non-monotonic or declining (see e. g. Storper (2011), Fernald and Jones (2014),
Gordon (2016)). Moreover the R&D productivity as the primary driver of growth may be
experiencing a decline. Conventional growth theories are not capable of explaining these
phenomena. This paper proposes one potential source of such non-monotonic growth:
heterogeneous and varying in time cross-technologies spillovers. Recent empirical findings
suggest that it is mainly the structure and not the intensity of cross-technologies spillovers
that governs growth (see Acemoglu et al. (2016)). It is found that the structure of cross-
sectoral spillovers is neither global (i. e. uniform as in standard endogenous growth
2
models) nor local (i. e. intra-sectoral) and thus the network effects are important. It
is then natural to capture those effects through a technology diffusion operator and its
spectral properties.
In this paper, the model of cross-technology interactions that is more general than
existing models regarding possible interdependencies of technological developments is de-
veloped. In particular I use the term of dynamic structural change to describe the economy
with continuous reallocation of labor from outdated sectors towards emerging ones and
continuous process of horizontal innovations combined with outdating of older technolo-
gies, as in Bondarev and Greiner (2019).
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, the general properties of such a
heterogeneous spillovers are studied. It is shown under which conditions the underlying
economy would possess balanced growth paths in decentralized and centralized cases. It
turns out that for market economy those conditions are very restrictive, whereas for a
social planner they are more relaxed.
Second I find out that the first-best solution for the economy is not always feasible
even without liquidity constraints for the government. Conditions for the feasibility of the
sustainable structural change are established based on the spectral properties of cross-
technologies interactions.
At last the characterization of the size and duration of regulation necessary to grant
dynamic consistency ot such an economy in technological transition are obtained.
In the next section, the model is described. Section 3 contains main results of the
paper. Section 4 studies limits of efficient regulation for this economy. Section 5 concludes.
Majority of auxiliary derivations and definitions as well as proofs are to be found in the
Online Appendices1.
2 Economy
The economy consists of households supplying labor and assets, manufacturing sector
supplying consumption goods and R&D sector inventing and developing new technologies.
There is a continuum of sectors as well as technologies and these become outdated because
of competitive pressure from newer technologies and limited resources (labour) reallocated
to more profitable technologies. The economy constantly experiences a structural change
1Any additional equations, definitions, lemmas and assumptions used in Appendices are referenced
with letters and numbers to separate them from main text objects.
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in the form of emergence of new sectors and obsolence of older ones and all existing
technologies are subject to cross-technologies spillovers, which make them heterogeneous.
In particular, the economy has the following ingredients:
2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes utility from consumption of a dynamic range of
final products,
JH =
∞∫
0
e−ρtU(C)dt, (1)
with U(C) = lnC being the utility function from composite consumption C consisting of
the continuum of products,
C =
[∫ Nmax
Nmin
C
ε−1
ε
i di
] ε
ε−1
, (2)
with 1 < ε <∞ being the elasticity of substitution between goods.
It supplies labor to a variety of final producers
L =
Nmax(t)∫
Nmin(t)
L(i, t)di,
Nmin(t) < Nmax(t) < N(t), (3)
where:
• L is the total labour in the economy (equal to population),
• L(i) is the employment in sector i,
• N(t) is the number of products or technologies (range) invented up to time t,
• Nmax(t) is the range of manufacturing sectors with positive operating profit (any
new technology does not immediately yield positive productivity),
• Nmin(t) is the range of sectors, which have disappeared from the economy up to
time t.
4
It also supplies accumulated assets to the R&D sector, given by the flow budget constraint
a˙ = ra+ L−
∫ Nmax
Nmin
PiCidi− Ta, (4)
with L the numeraire so that the wage rate is equal to one and where:
• a is the value of assets being hold by the households
• r is the interest rate
• T is the income tax rate (time-varying or not)
see Online Appendix A for derivations of expenditures E =
∫ Nmax
Nmin
PiCidi. dynamics.
2.2 Final producers
Final product C = Y =
∫ Nmax(t)
Nmin(t)
Yidi is a composite of products i ∈ [Nmin(t);Nmax(t)]
each of which is produced in a monopolistically competitive fashion by separate firm
with production technology linear in labour with productivity defined by the state of the
associated technology i (its quality).
∀i ∈ [Nmin(t);Nmax(t)] : Yi = Aαi Li , (5)
where 0 < α < 1 determines the marginal product of the technological input. The
productivity Ai is the result of vertical innovations that raise the quality of a given
technology and that are generated by the R&D sector.
The range of operational sectors is dynamic reflecting the continuous process of arrival
of new technologies and outdating of older ones. This last happens because of positive
operational costs Ψ experienced by every manufacturing firm. The profit of firm i is
Πi = PiYi − Li −Ψ , (6)
yielding demand for labor and price for product i as functions of productivity Ai within
the operational time t ∈ [τmax(i); τmin(i)] with τmax(i) being the time technology i becomes
operational and τmin(i) the time it becomes non-competitive. See derivations of labour
demand LDi and price for final product Pi in Online Appendix B.
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2.3 R&D sector
Every technology is first invented through horizontal innovations at a frontier N(t) with
zero productivity. It is then gradually improved until it reaches the operational frontier,
Nmax(t) and keeps improving until technology is no longer profitable and reaches the
obsolence frontier Nmin(t).
Both horizontal and vertical R&D are financed through assets being held by households
and incentivized by patent payment pA(i) (defined by (B.6) in Online Appendix B) from
manufacturing firms which captures all potential profit from subsequent production.
Thus, the total sum of both kinds of R&D investments at any time forms the demand
for assets in the economy:
u(t) +
N(t)∫
Nmin(t)
g(i, t)di = aD(t) , (7)
where
• u(t) are horizontal innovations investments at time t;
• g(i, t) are vertical innovations investments at time t for technology i within the range
of invented and not out-dated technologies, [Nmin(t), N(t)];
• aD(t) is the total demand for assets.
At the horizontal level there is a free entry and every successful innovator is granted an
exclusive patent for the technology and hence is the only firm allowed to further develop
it.
The creation of new technologies (horizontal innovations) in general follows the setup
of Peretto and Connolly (2007) and closely of Bondarev and Greiner (2019). Assume
that new technologies appear due to knowledge creation mechanisms that are governed
by private initiatives of competitive R&D firms. New technologies are created through
R&D investments, u(t), chosen optimally by the firms2:
N˙ = u(t) , (8)
2of course the horizontal dimension may include knowledge spillovers as in standard endogenous growth
models. This is assumed away to streamline the exposition.
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These are financed from the assets of the households a(t) and represent a part of the total
assets demand aD in (7).
The value of horizontal R&D consists solely in expected future profits from vertical
innovations:
VN = max
u(•)
∞∫
0
e−rt
(
piR(i)|i=Nu(t)− 1
2
u2(t)
)
dt. (9)
Here, the profit of developing the next technology i = N , piR(i)|i=N , equals the value of
vertical innovations into technology i, which is given by:
piR(i) = pA(i)− 1
2
τmin∫
τ0
e−r(t−τ0)g2(i, t)dt, (10)
with investments g(i, t) going into the increase of productivity A(i, t) as long as the
technology is operational.
Each R&D firm derives profit from capturing all monopolistic rents from the manu-
facturing sector and optimally designs inter temporally investments into the development
of the subsequent technology.
Apart from optimally controlled R&D efforts every technology is subject to uncon-
trolled spillovers coming from all other existing technologies (including intra-technology
spillover θ(i, i)), so that the total evolution of A(i, t) is governed by two components3:
A˙(i, t) = A˙P (i, t) + A˙SP (i, t) = gP (i, t) +
∫ N(τmin(i))
Nmin(τ0(i))
θ(i, j)A(j, t)dj − A(i, t) (11)
So the total level A(i, t) which is utilized by manufacturing firms and which affects through
spillovers other sectors, contains both individual investments and the spillover part. See
further derivations for R&D in Online Appendix C.
Firms do not account for their impact on other technologies but only for the spillover
received by the firm itself, whereas the social planner does4. The total knowledge spillover
experienced by the economy is given by the operator Θ with entries θ(i, j) measuring
individual impacts.
3Observe that the actual decay rate of technolgoy i equals (1 − θ(i, i))A(i, t) and can be positive or
negative (intra-technology spillover)
4See Online Appendix D for the social planner’s problem formulation.
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This operator is the central part of the analysis. It is the continuous counterpart of the
technology diffusion matrix. As such it shares some properties with usual matrices but is
a much more general object. In particular, it may possess much richer spectral properties.
The main contribution of a paper is to find a correspondence between properties of the
economy’s growth rates (size, sign, sustainability, balanced growth path properties, etc.)
and spectral properties of this operator Θ. At this point I set no restrictions on the
structure of technological spillovers; it turns out that the more specific is the operator,
the closer is the economy to a standard one.
At last decentralized equilibrium is given by all markets clearing: expenditures are
constant due to price dynamics, labour is redistributed towards newer sectors from older
ones, assets are growing with rate r once there is sufficient initial endowment (otherwise
no growth is possible) and thus resource constraint for the R&D is not binding, i. e.
there is always sufficient capital to finance R&D investments. See Online Appendix E for
market clearing conditions.
3 Results
In this section I study the model described above. First the long-run behavior of both
decentralized and socially optimal economies are described and then I discuss the necessity,
scale and duration of interventions.
3.1 The BGP existence conditions
I first briefly state results similar for benchmark and heterogeneous cases and then add
some new insights appearing due to the spillover operator Θ.
Proposition 1. The productivity of the oldest operational sector, ANmin, is equal to the
productivity of the newest operational sector, ANmax, at the time when the first is leaving
the economy and the latter is entering its operational phase:
ANmin =
(Ψ/L)(− 1) Nmax∫
Nmin
A
α(−1)
j dj
1/α(−1) = ANmax . (12)
At the same time, the productivity of each sector grows within its operational phase,
Ai(τmin(i)) > Ai(τmax(i)). (13)
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Proof. This follows from the zero profit condition defining the operational phase for any
i (see Lemma C.2 in Online Appendix C).
Since profit is zero on both ends of the operational phase and it is nonnegative in
between it follows that
Lemma 1. For any technology i exists at least one point τ¯(i) such that the profit of the
manufacturing sector is at maximum and it holds
Π˙(i) = 0⇔
A˙(i, t)
A(i, t)
−
Nmax∫
Nmin
A˙(j, t)
A(j, t)
dj
 = Ψ
αL
(N˙max − N˙min). (14)
Proof. By mean value theorem, see any analysis textbook, as Stromberg (1981).
By Lemma 1 there are exactly two options for (14) to hold: either both sides simulta-
neously equal zero (which is the case for the baseline symmetric model) or generically,
∀i ∈ [0,∞] : ∃τ¯(i) : gA(i)(τ¯(i))− g¯A(τ¯(i))O˙(τ¯(i)) =
Ψ
αL
(15)
where we denote gA(i)
def
= A˙(i,t)
A(i,t)
the growth rate of productivity for technology i, g¯A
def
=
Nmax∫
Nmin
A˙(j,t)
A(j,t)
dj the average growth rate of productivities and O˙ def= N˙max − N˙min the shift
describing the change in the size of the economy.
We call the technology, which reaches at t maximum profit the leading technology. We
infer the following observation from (15):
Corollary 1. As soon as the growth rate of the leading technology is below average, the
economy shrinks in size and vice versa.
Proof. Indeed, since Ψ
αL
is always positive, it follows that once the numerator of the
righthandside in (15) is negative, the denominator is negative too, implying N˙max(τ¯(i)) <
N˙min(τ¯(i)). This means the economy shrinks in size. With above average growth rate the
opposite holds.
It then follows that the output growth rate in the heterogeneous economy includes
additional element defined by the Corollary 1 and can be non-monotonic and varying in
sign:
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Corollary 2. The output growth may be positive or negative in the economy with hetero-
geneous spillovers and is given by:
gY
def
=
Y˙
Y
= αg¯A(Nmax −Nmin) + Ψ
αL
(N˙max − N˙min) R 0 (16)
Proof. Follows the same lines as in the baseline model for positive growth except that
condition N˙max = N˙min does not always hold. It then follows that once economy shrinks,
growth may be negative.
In particular, if the growth rate is positive together with the core expansion O˙ > 0,
such type of growth is not sustainable: as long as the expansion happens long enough as
for tE : Nmax(t
E) − Nmin(tE) → ∞ to realize, the growth becomes undefined, since the
economy would consist of the infinitely many infinitely small sectors with infinitely low
productivity.
On the other hand, if the second term is negative, implying core of the economy
shrinks, this type of growth, even with positive growth rates, is also unsustainable in the
long-run: as soon as for tS : Nmax(t
S) − Nmin(tS) = 0 new sectors become outdated at
the very same moment they become operational. Then the long-term growth rate is zero,
since Nmax ≥ Nmin cannot be violated by definition of these quantities.
Next define the balanced growth path (BGP) based on previous discussion:
Definition 1. The BGP of the economy described in Section 2 is the path along which
two conditions hold:
1. The output growth rate is positive and constant
∀t ∈ [t0,∞) : gY ≥ 0, g˙Y = 0 (17)
2. The economy’s size stays positive and finite:
∀t ∈ [t0,∞) : 0 < O(t) <∞ (18)
The first condition (17) is the standard one, implying the economy grows in the long
run. It does not require all the variables to grow at the same rate, but only the out-
put, since assets and productivity would then automatically follow some balanced growth
pattern (see e. g. Barbier (1999) for close definition of BGP).
The second condition is novel and reflects the importance of structural change: as
soon as the number of technologies becoming operational exceeds the number of becoming
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outdated on a regular basis, the size of Nmax −Nmin = O grows without bounds and the
growth becomes unsustainable. One may speak of the over-diversification of the economy:
there are too many different technologies/sectors so the limited labour force is not enough
to keep them running. At the same time, if the opposite happens, Nmax = Nmin, there
is only one technology present in manufacturing at any time and it varies continuously,
making it impossible to invest into the rise of productivity. In this case although vertical
R&D takes place rising the productivity of new technologies, these technologies cannot
stay operational long enough to provide positive profits for manufacturers and thus a
stimulus for further inventions. This is the situation of overburning : the structural change
intensifies so much, that older technologies are scrapped faster, then the economy may
compensate them with newer ones.
We thus see than the only usual BGP in this economy is exactly the one described by
the benchmark model with constant size of the core, O˙ = 0. Still, this may happen only
in a very special case as the following Proposition 2 shows.
In what follows I use:
Assumption 1. The spillover operator Θ is a spectral one.
For definitions of spectral properties of Θ used throughout the paper see Appendix F.
Roughly speaking the requirement to Θ to be spectral just restricts analysis to spillover
operators which are the closest to finite-dimensional ones but not necessarily compact.
We are now ready to characterize the BGP existence of the decentralized economy.
Proposition 2 (On BGP existence for decentralised economy with spillovers).
Assume Θ 6= 0 and all spillovers are non-negative, ∀{i, j} : θi,j ≥ 0. Then:
1. As long as Θ is a scalar operator (see Definition F.2), the decentralized economy
always possesses a BGP with constant growth rates. It is defined by the spillover
size as
g¯θA =

θ − 1, if θ > 1;
1, if θ = 1;
r, if θ < 1.
(19)
2. As long as Θ is a scalar-type operator (see Definition F.3), the decentralised economy
possesses a BGP with constant growth rate independent of the spillover size g¯0A = r
if ρ(Θ) ≤ 1 and no BGP in the sense of Definition 1 otherwise;
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3. If Θ is not a scalar-type operator, there is no BGP type Definition 1 in the decen-
tralized economy with heterogeneous spillovers.
Proof. see Online Appendix G.
This proposition tells us that the market economy may converge to a BGP only if the
spillovers are either intra-sectoral (spillover matrix is diagonal) or if there are cross-sectoral
spillovers, they should be limited in their intensity (spectral radius does not exceed 1, i.e
all entries of Θ are bounded).
The Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual reconstruction of the economy with balanced
growth path for the case of balanced structural change.
Figure 1: The BGP for the economy with O˙ = 0
There Q(t) denotes the overall productivity of the economy and ellipses represent the
total product of existing range of sectors. Since the variety expansion and obsolence rates
are balanced, the range of existing sectors remains unchanged, but productivity of newer
sectors grows due to higher abundance of assets, thus growth is balanced and sustainable.
Observe that for the social planner problem the BGP can be achieved in a wider
variety of situations than for the decentralized economy:
Proposition 3. The socially optimal R&D system (D.3) admits the balanced growth path
in a sense of Definition 1 as soon as either:
1. Operator Θ is of the scalar-type
2. Operator Θ is compact (see Definition F.4).
Otherwise no socially optimal BGP exists.
12
Proof. see Online Appendix H
So the economy with a social planner would converge to a BGP either if spillovers if
heterogeneous, may be internalized ( matrix is diagonizable) to appropriate sectors/firms
or if this is not the case, at least the spillover experienced by any technology is bounded
and can be traced back to the source technology.
If this is not the case, and there are distributed or non-point source spillovers in the
economy, long-run stability of the BGP cannot be granted even under optimally planned
development.
Define (a weaker notion of) sustained growth path:
Definition 2. The economy follows a sustained growth path if (18) holds, but not neces-
sarily (17).
It is immediate to observe that once the economy is on the sustainable growth path
(SGP), it might experience prolonged periods of negative and positive growth, but the
requirement (18) implies that long run growth stays positive and finite on average, so this
economy may sustain growth for infinite time.
Figure 2 illustrates cases of unsustainable and sustainable, but non-monotonic growth
paths.
In case a. O˙ > 0 constantly and the economy reaches the state with infinitely many
sectors of zero productivity. In case c. O˙ < 0 continuously and economy ends up with
a single infinitely productive technology. In case b. the growth is non-monotonic but
sustainable: the size of economy neither reaches infinity nor zero. As it will be shown in
the Section 3 such trajectory may be reached only with the help of the government and
the market economy alone cannot return to the balanced (or sustained) path by itself
once some technological shock has driven the economy away from the equilibrium.
3.2 Dynamic inefficiency
In this part of the paper the potential inefficiencies of both decentralized and centralized
economy are studied.
3.2.1 Market inefficiency
Proposition 2 states that the decentralized economy admits the constant sustained growth
path only as long as spillovers operator Θ is scalar or of the scalar-type and has limited
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Figure 2: Non-balanced growth paths for O˙ ≶ 0
size (spectral radius is small enough). Now observe that typically dynamic nature of
technologies’ spectrum implies that the spillovers’ structure changes continuously. We
thus need some additional machinery to tackle with this issue.
Consider Θ|t0 : restriction of the spillover operator to the (fixed) time instant t0. This
restriction is a standard operator over the space of technologies, independent of time and
thus it makes sense to define the compactness5 of this restriction:
Definition 3. Operator Θ is said to be t0-compact if its restriction to t0 is compact in all
existing at t0 technologies J |t0 := {i|Nmin(t0) ≤ i ≤ N(t0)}.
Operator Θ is said to be t0-scalar(-type) if its restriction to t0 is scalar(-type) in all
existing at t0 technologies J |t0.
Following Proposition 2 denote by F ⊆ R+ those time instances t when operator Θ is
t-scalar-type with small spectral radius or just scalar:
F def= {t : ρ(Θ(i, j)|t) ≤ 1} (20)
5The linear operator is compact if it maps bounded subsets of the domain into relatively compact
subsets of its range, see e. g. Kolmogorov and Fomin (1999).
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and by G ⊆ R+ those time instances when the operator does not admit t-scalar form.
Then it follows that at any time t the spillover may take one of two forms: either it
admits consistent decentralised solution or not.
Denote further by S the form of the spillover operator at t which admits dynamically
consistent market solution (e. g. scalar or scalar-type with spectral radius smaller then
1):
S
def
= Θ|t∈F (21)
Proposition 4 (Market failure).
For any t ∈ [0,∞) :
1. As long as ∀t ∈ F ⊆ [0,∞) : Θ|t∈F = S market solution grants sustained positive
long-run growth rates to the economy and no government intervention is needed.
2. As soon as ∃tS ∈ G ⊆ [0,∞) : Θ|t≥tS 6= S, market solution leads to the collapse
of the economy in finite time and government intervention is necessary for some
positive duration starting from tS onwards.
Proof. See Online Appendix I
Comment: The last property is widely known as the knife-edge property of endogenous
growth models: once finely tuned conditions are violated, the economy cannot return to
the balanced growth path. For discussion of these see e. g. Peretto and Valente (2015).
The main novelty of the Proposition 4 lies in its dynamic nature: market economy can be
efficient and sustainable for some time, but only until essentially cross-sectoral spillovers
would appear in the economy. Once this is the case, such cross-sectoral interactions have
to be dealt with. Moreover even when the technology causing initial spillover would be
scrapped, it is not the case that the distortion caused by it will immediately stop, since
there could be cascading persistent effects (for details see Section 4).
From the other hand, Proposition 4 establishes the conditions for market interven-
tions. These need not to be constant or even continuous. Rather the government should
additionally intervene in a timely manner only at those time instances t ∈ G when homo-
geneity condition for technologies is violated. Such a result is possible only for a dynamic
range of technologies. Indeed, once we set N˙ = 0 the interactions operator Θ is fixed and
its current structure fully defines whether there is a need in the regulation or not. This
regulation is then permanently in place (although the scale of intervention may decrease
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over time) and its efficiency fully resembles that of Bondarev and Krysiak (2017) where
the cross-technologies interactions are time-invariant.
3.2.2 Government inefficiency
We next tackle the question under which conditions the government regulation may help
the economy to achieve the sustained growth path. Observe that the Definition 2 does
not imply the uniqueness of the SGP. On the contrary there might exist a lot of evolution
paths of the economy which make the O operator positive and finite. I refer to the SGP
as the optimal if it yields maximal social welfare among possible SGPs. With this in mind
let us consider the dynamic efficiency of the government in achieving the optimal SGP.
Proposition 5 (Government efficiency).
For any t ∈ [0,∞) :
1. As long as t ∈ G, but Θt∈G is compact, government subsidies may implement the
first-best solution and sustained BGP is achieved;
2. As soon as Θt∈G is not compact, but its residual spectrum is null, the government
policy may help the economy to approach the optimal SGP with approximation error
increasing in the size of continuous spectrum of Θt∈G;
3. As soon as Θt∈G is not compact and its residual spectrum is non-empty, only the
economy-wide average subsidy is welfare improving, but the economy will not con-
verge to the optimal SGP.
Proof. see Online Appendix J
The Proposition 5 illustrates the fact that government has limited influence on the
economy: at some times it can improve upon the market failure and return the economy
on the BGP, but at other times it could be the case that any government intervention
cannot help to stabilize the economy and economy-wide crisis follows. Apparently this
would be the case when some fundamentally new technology appears (like those studied
in the literature on general purpose technologies (GPT), see Bresnahan (2010) for an
overview) which has impact on a broad range of dispersed sectors. This would be the
case 3. of the Proposition 5. If this new technology’s impact is limited and affects some
isolated group of industries, the case 2. realizes and the government may at least smooth
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away part of this influence. In normal situation case 1. realizes, when new technologies
influence existing structure of the economy in a limited way6.
In particular, both Propositions 4 and 5 pave the way to obtain non-monotonic growth
rates in the otherwise fully analytic endogenous growth model. It thus may be applied
to observed stylized facts concerning growth: it can be non-monotonic, growth rates
may diverge across countries, government interventions are necessary but not sufficient to
smooth away all fluctuations along the growth path.
4 Policy implications: Size and duration of regula-
tion
I next ask the question on the duration of government intervention for a particular ex-
ternality caused by the new technology. Let us again limit the attention to spectral
operators only (see Definition F.6), which is the fairly general class of operators for which
the spectral theory is well established.
Any compact operator is spectral but not vice versa. The scalar-type operator is
the immediate infinite-dimensional extension of what is called semi-simple operator, that
is, the one without defective eigenvalues. The nilpotent part thus would contain all of
potential complexities of the operator.
First the compact case is studied, where I understand compactness in the sense of
Definition 3.
4.1 t-compact case
Assume economy is evolving in such a way that Θ is compact w. r. t. J |t for all
time t ∈ [0, t0]. Compact operators possess point-wise non-zero spectrum and zero as a
continuous spectrum, see Kolmogorov and Fomin (1999) for details. Thus this situation
falls into case 1 of Proposition 5 and we may apply the property rights reform as defined
below.
Definition 4. The property rights reform in economy is given by canonical form of the
operator Θ. In particular, it assigns to each technology i all of its externalities according
to the spectrum of Θ
6Compactness of the operator means it maps bounded sequences to bounded sequences, thus spillovers
are smoothly distributed and bounded.
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In particular this is the restatement of the result that operator Θ has resolution of
identity and can be ’diagonalized’ in a sense that it is unitary similar to the multiplication
operator. The multiplication operator is an infinite-dimensional equivalent of a diagonal
matrix. Thus this reform just reassigns shares of different technologies in such a way
that newly defined entities do not have cross-technologies interactions, i. e. the spillover
operator is ’diagonal’.
This property rights reform obviously makes sense only for the operator with non-zero
pointwise spectrum, since otherwise it is not clear where to attribute some of externalities.
If we consider the case of compact operator we immediately see (with the help of
Lemma F.1, see Online Appendix F) that government intervention always have only two
components:
1. Rearranging property rights via the spectral decomposition of Θ
2. Subsidies/taxes for technologies with Re(λi) > 1
3. Subsidies/taxes for the technologies which have spillovers entering the nilpotent part
of Θ
The first part is always possible once operator is compact and Lemma F.1 holds. Indeed,
for any semi-simple operator in finite dimensions the Jordan canonical form (JCF, see
Weintraub (2008) for example) is diagonal. Then for compact spectral infinite-dimensional
case we get equivalent as the resolution of identity with pointwise eigenvalues as a diago-
nal infinite-dimensional matrix. Moreover, the scalar-type part then exactly corresponds
to the part of cross-technologies interactions which does not require any additional inter-
vention: the reformed operator is already a scalar one. So the only instability source left
is the possibly high impact of knowledge spillover, case 2 and the complexity impacts,
reflected by the nilpotent part.
Now the duration of these two types of intervention is different: the knowledge spillover
θ(i, i) has to be taken care of only within the operational phase of technology i. Indeed,
this is the spillover affecting only this given technology (after redefinition of property
rights) and thus once it becomes non-profitable there is no need in further regulation.
The nilpotent part, however, has to be regulated for a longer time: even once tech-
nology becomes outdated, its impact on other technologies persists through cascading
impacts. This cascades are long-term persistent effects which slowly deteriorate over
time. The duration of these post-effects is proportional to the number of technologies
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being affected (size of affected cluster) and fully vanishes only once all the technologies in
this affected cluster are outdated. Denote, following Bondarev and Krysiak (2017), the
size of the nilpotent part by the number of eigenvalues entering it:
Definition 5. The t-complexity of the (t-compact) operator Θ is the number of eigenvalues
with different algebraic and geometric multiplicities:
χ(Θ|t) def=
K∑
i
(µa(λi − µg(λi))) (22)
where µg(λi), µ
a(λi) are geometric and algebraic multiplicities of a given eigenvalue λi.
Observe that this definition makes sense only for the operator with point-wise spectrum
(except zero), since for continuous and residual spectra notions of algebraic and geometric
multiplicities are not well-defined. Still as long as we are in the compact case the notion
of complexity is useful, as the following demonstrates
Proposition 6. Assume Θ|t is compact. Then:
1. As long as Θ|t is of scalar-type and ρ(Θ|t) ≤ 1 the government intervention for each
t consists solely of rearranging property rights via canonical decomposition of Θ;
2. As soon as Θ|t is of scalar-type but ρ(Θ|t) > 1 government regulation includes
additionally subsidies ∀i1 : λ(i1) > 1 size the impact for the duration τmin(i1)−τ0(i1);
3. As soon as Θ|t contains non-zero nilpotent part and ∞ > χ(Θ|t) > 0, exactly χ(Θ|t)
additional cascading subsidies are necessary with the duration for each cluster being
∀k ∈ χ(Θ|t) : maxk τmin(ik)−maxk τ0(ik)
4. As soon as χ(Θ|t) → ∞ the regulation is permanent and continuous as long as
complexity stays infinite.
Proof. see Online Appendix K.
So even in the best possible world of compact cross-technologies interactions there
are cases when the first-best outcome may be achieved only with the help of continuous
regulation. Still there are multiple instances where the time-limited and technology-
specific intervention is sufficient. Observe that not only the size (intensity) of technological
spillovers, but the structure (through the complexity measure) has crucial importance for
the size and duration of these interventions.
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However the interactions operator needs not to be compact. For example, the emer-
gence of the drastic innovation (or GPT) would violate compactness assumption. I study
what can be done in the case of a non-compact operator Θ in the concluding part of this
section.
4.2 Noncompact interactions
Specify within the set G those time instances when Θ is t-compact and when it is not.
Denote
G1 := {t ∈ G} : σ(Θ|t) = σp(Θ|t),
G2 := {t ∈ G} : σ(Θ|t) = σp(Θ|t) ∪ σc(Θ|t),
G3 := {t ∈ G} : σr(Θ|t) 6= ∅,
G = G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3, T := [0,∞) = G ∪ F (23)
where σp(Θ|t), σc(Θ|t), σr(Θ|t) denote point-wise, continuous and residual components of
the spectrum σ(Θ|t) respectively.
Once Θ|t is compact we apply Proposition 6 from above. Once it is not compact but
self-adjoint, it may possess continuous, but not the residual spectrum. In other words
the operator Θ at t ∈ G2 remains the spectral operator, but is no longer compact. Thus
it admits the canonical decomposition into scalar-type and nilpotent parts, but not the
JCD-type decomposition (formulated by Lemma F.1 in Online Appendix F), since some
part of the spectrum is continuous.
In this case the new technology appearing at some tb ∈ G2 has substantial impact
on an open set of pre-existing sectors, so that the boundaries of this impact cannot
be determined precisely. The government regulation would include additional corrective
subsidies for a group of affected technologies up to a point when the technology generating
this spillover will become outdated (and thus t-compactness is restored). This additional
subsidy however cannot be finely tuned as to grant the first-best allocation, since it is
not clear to what extent the technologies in the affected group experience the externality.
Thus this additional subsidy is group-specific but uniform within the affected group. This
inefficiency comes into being because for the case of continuous spectrum the complexity
χ(Θ|t) is not well-defined: one could count the number of affected clusters, but not
the number of affected technologies within each cluster. The canonical decomposition
yields the sum of multiplication-similar operator (which is then subject to property rights
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reform) and the nilpotent operator which contains all essentially complex interactions,
but they are not isolated as in the compact case.
At last, once at some tn ∈ G3 the new technology appears which is GPT-like and
affects the whole structure of the economy, the interactions operator exhibits residual
spectral component (i. e. is not self-adjoint and not compact). In this case there is no
government policy in the class of subsidies which would allow the economy to approach
the first-best BGP (since this does not exist at all).
5 Conclusion
In this paper the novel endogenous growth framework with dynamic structural change is
used to study the role of cross-technologies interactions. These interactions are represented
as a general infinite-dimensional matrix of pairwise technology interaction intensities.
The overall knowledge spillover experienced by a given technology is then a result of the
summing up individual impacts of all existing technologies weighted by intensity of the
influence and the level of development of those technologies themselves. Such a shape of
the spillover is fairly flexible and can capture the standard type of knowledge spillovers
studied previously in the literature (like Peretto and Smulders (2002)) but also new types
of spillovers. For example it allows for one-way (asymmetric) spillovers and heterogeneity
of interactions.
It turns out that the decentralized economy would possess a balanced growth path
exhibiting constant growth rates only for the very special type of knowledge spillover,
which is by no coincidence the only one previously studied. These are scalar interactions
describing equal spillover intensities for all the technologies dependent only of the technol-
ogy itself. In all other cases the market cannot provide the dynamically consistent way of
technological transition without government interventions. This result is independent of
the specific model at hand, since unequal spillovers lead to competitive advantage of some
of the technologies and the capital mobility ensures these are the only surviving technolo-
gies in the long run. On the other hand the first-best solution is dynamically consistent
in a wider variety of cases. Namely it suffices for cross-technologies interactions to form
a compact operator, i. e. all interactions are well defined on closed sets and are bounded
in size. If this is the case the socially optimal solution may be achieved through a set of
taxes/subsidies on the R&D eliminating those disbalancing competitive advantages.
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In particular, two different regulation tools are suggested: the redefinition of property
rights such that every technology becomes separated and independent of all the others
and additional taxation of those sectors which grow faster then the average growth rate
of the economy.
The second contribution of the paper is the general characterization of those cases,
when not only the market but the social planner’s solution cannot grant the dynamical
efficiency to the economy. These are cases when the spillover operator is more complex
and includes spillovers affecting a significant range of technologies and those for which
the source cannot be identified precisely. In the latter case the balanced growth may be
at least approximated whereas in the former case there is no way to achieve the first-best
growth rates.
At last the characterization of the size and duration of interventions has been carried
out. The time-varying economic policy impulses which depend on the spectral structure
of the spillover operator in a general way are introduced. The periods of qualitatively
different regulation are defined solely by the spectral structure of the spillover operator.
Despite their abstract nature, the results of this paper have immediate policy impli-
cations. First, it is crucial to take into account not only the intensity, but also the scope
and structure of knowledge spillovers and technologies’ interactions when designing the
R&D policy.
Second, if the economy is undergoing structural change such that older technologies
and sectors disappear and newer ones emerge (as is the case with large-scale renewable
energy transitions) the decentralized economy is unlikely to achieve the balanced growth
without government interventions. However some sustained growth may be achieved
at least temporarily, but the balanced growth cannot be restored automatically due to
distortions being brought into the system by the advance of newer technologies.
Third, the efficiency of government regulation of a large scale structural change de-
pends crucially on the scale of such changes and the scope of affected sectors. If only
isolated sectors/technologies are affected by new technologies, the conventional subsidiz-
ing policy would be efficient in restoring the equilibrium path of the economy. If significant
clusters of sectors are under impact of emerging technologies, the government may be able
to achieve the sustainable, but not the balanced growth and at last if the entire economy
is affected by some general purpose technology, the optimal path cannot be sustained
and (temporary) crisis is unavoidable. It thus seems that the large scale technical change
comes at the cost of temporary slowdown in economic performance.
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There are still many directions in the suggested framework open for future research
with two of them being particularly intriguing. First, the impact of free-riding technologies
may turn the dynamics to be even more complicated and become unpredictable, justifying
the robust policy tools choice on the macroeconomic level. Second, the distribution of
some technologies spillovers may be unbounded (consider fire or electricity as examples)
making some spillovers non-local. Both these directions require far more complicated
analytical tools to study and are left for future research.
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